The Attitudes of British Jews Towards Israel

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The relationship between British Jews and Israel is the focus of intense debate, political analysis and communal interest. Yet as a field of empirical research, with one notable exception\(^1\), British Jewish attitudes to Israel are rarely investigated and poorly understood. This makes it easy for speculation and assertion to triumph over evidence; and it means that the representation of the British Jewish community’s stance on Israel, and the quality of its internal discourse, are both undermined.

This report seeks to improve the evidence base available to scholars with an interest in perceptions of Israel. It provides up-to-date, reliable data on the way British Jews see Israel and how they construe their own obligations towards it. Using standard research methodologies, we have collected data on the attitudes of 1131 British Jews towards Israel’s policies and conduct, and also assessed their feelings about its approach to peace and negotiations with the Palestinians.

The research was conducted in the period March to July 2015, roughly one year after the conflict in Gaza in the summer of 2014, and some five years after the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) published its landmark study on the same theme. That research demonstrated Israel’s central role in the construction of Jewish identity. It found almost universal support for Israel’s legitimacy as the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people and a strong desire for peace and security. The JPR study also showed that British Jewish opinions on the political issues confronting Israel are diverse and not easily captured by simple monolithic statements. In particular, it found that opinions that are highly critical of Israel’s conduct and policies may often co-exist with clear support for its legitimacy and survival.

The JPR research was the first robust attempt to calibrate British Jewish attitudes towards Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians. The present study addresses similar issues some five years on – post the 2014 Gaza conflict, the emergence of ISIS, further expansion of the settlements, increased boycott activity and a raft of other political developments. We have repeated some of the JPR attitude measurements and we have also looked at attitudes to some new issues, including sanctions against Israel, the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs, and priorities for the new (2015) Israeli government. This study also examines for the first time the accuracy with which individual Jews can assess the representativeness of their own views about Israel.

Our report sets out the key statistical findings and offers a straightforward interpretation of what they show. Some brief comments on the possible implications of those findings are included in the final section of the report.

The research was funded by Yachad - a pro-Israel, pro-peace campaigning group – and we are grateful to the board, director and staff for supporting our work. However, the design and analysis of the survey was undertaken by the research team working independently of the funding body. The data collection was undertaken by the independent research organisation Ipsos MORI and the questionnaire was designed by the authors working with Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute and with advice from a panel of Jewish lay and professional advisers (see Appendix 2).

Structure of the report

This report is in three sections:

Section 1 summarizes the research methodology, with a fuller account of the sampling strategy set out in Appendix 1.

Section 2 sets out the key findings, divided into three parts:

A - examines overall attitudes to Israel as a Jewish state;

B - provides a detailed analysis of attitudes to specific issues; and

C - plots variations in attitude across different sections of the community and examines which factors are associated with having hawkish and dovish opinions.

Section 3 points briefly to some key findings which appear to us to have implications for the British Jewish community and its relationship with Israel.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report explores the attitudes of 1131 British Jews towards Israel and its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. The research was conducted in the period March to July 2015, roughly one year after the 2014 Gaza conflict.

• The research examines the nature of British Jewish attachment to Israel and the level of support for its current policies and conduct. It covers a wide range of issues including attitudes towards settlement expansion, Palestinian rights, the 2014 Gaza conflict, sanctions against Israel, the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs, the need for security and priorities for the new Israeli government.

• The research also examines how attitudes to Israel vary with age, synagogue affiliation, level of education and political stance. And it explores for the first time, the ability of British Jews to assess the extent to which their own views are representative of the Jewish community as a whole.

• Data collection was based on an online survey instrument designed by the authors in conjunction with Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute. Data collection was managed solely by Ipsos MORI, but the analysis and interpretation of the data was the responsibility of the authors working independently of any other body.

• The sampling strategy and research methodology are described in the body of the report and in Appendix 1. The achieved sample, after weighting, corresponded closely to known characteristics of the British Jewish community with respect to age, synagogue affiliation, education, political attitudes and geographical location.

• The estimates set out in this summary are subject to a margin of error of 2.9% in either direction when based on the entire sample.

Attachment to Israel

• British Jews are strongly attached to Israel. The vast majority of our respondents support its right to exist as a Jewish state (90%), express pride in its cultural and scientific achievements (84%), see it as a vibrant and open democracy (78%) and say that it forms some part of their identity as Jews (93%).

Peace, Two-States and Palestinian rights to a land of their own

• Beyond their near-universal commitment to Israel as a Jewish state, respondents are divided on most of the political issues confronting the country. There is, however a clear majority position on three key matters:

  Peace is seen as a priority: Of nine suggested priorities for the new Israeli government, “pursuing peace negotiations with the Palestinians” is ranked first (61% chose it); this is followed by action to “halt the expansion of settlements” (46%). These options are placed well above items related to security, economics and public relations. The desire for peace is also reflected in the finding that half of those with an opinion is in favour of conducting peace negotiations with Hamas (42%-42%).

  The two-state solution as the way forward: The vast majority of respondents (71% as against 16%) agree that “the two state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East”. That view is underpinned by two related attitudes: (i) that “Israel should give up territory in exchange for guarantees of peace”, endorsed by 62%-25%; (ii) the perception that Israel is “an occupying power in the West Bank”, agreed to by 53%-29%.

  Palestinian rights to a land of their own: On this central issue, 72% (as against 14%) accept that the Palestinians have a “legitimate claim to a land of their own”.  

7 Most items have six response options: strongly agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to disagree, strongly disagree, don’t know. Figures quoted in this summary typically represent the total of the two agree percentages set against the total of the disagree percentages. Given the variable number of responses in the middle (neutral) category, we represent the balance of opinion in the form “X% as against Y%” or sometimes simply as “X:Y”. We have disregarded the small proportion of “don’t know” responses when computing these percentages.
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- These attitudes, taken together, reflect a strongly dovish stance on peace, in keeping with the findings of the JPR study conducted five years ago. These dovish attitudes appear to colour the respondents' attitudes to the settlements and, to some extent, to the use of sanctions.

**Opposition to settlement expansion and the use of sanctions**

- On settlements, 75% (as against 14%) agree that “the expansion of settlements on the West Bank is a major obstacle to peace”. The impact of settlement expansion on respondents' feelings is reflected in the statement “I feel a sense of despair every time Israel approves further expansion of settlements” - endorsed by 68%:18%.

- A majority of the respondents expect “unstoppable international pressure for sanctions against Israel if it continues to expand the settlements” (64%:16%). There is however, no clear desire for the British Government to take “tougher action” to oppose settlement expansion. 32% are in favour of tougher action and 47% are against it.

- Despite the very strong opposition to sanctions against Israel by the majority of respondents (66%), almost a quarter (24%) said they would be prepared “to support some sanctions against Israel if I thought they would encourage the Israeli government to engage in the peace process”.

- Preparedness to support sanctions varies between 11% and 41% across different segments of the British Jewish community.

**Demography, security and withdrawal from the West Bank**

- Despite strong opposition to the expansion of settlements and strong support for a Palestinian homeland, respondents' attitudes to Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank are generally equivocal and highly sensitive to context.

- There is clear support for withdrawal when it is linked to peace (62%:25%), more luke-warm support when withdrawal is suggested in order to ensure that Israel governs a Jewish majority (39%:34%), and clear opposition if withdrawal is linked to possible risks to Israel's security (33% for withdrawal:50% against it).

- Nonetheless the majority view is that “Israel will be seen as an ‘apartheid state’ if it tries to retain control over borders which include more Arabs than Jews” (58%:22%).

**Perceived obstacles to peace**

- In regard to barriers to the peace negotiations, a clear majority (70%:18%) say that the Palestinians “must recognise Israel as a Jewish state, not just recognise Israel's right to exist”. The respondents also see negotiations as “pointless as long as incitement against Israel is taught in Palestinian schools” (63%:30%) and they endorse the view that “there is no credible Palestinian partner for Israel to make peace with” (59%:24%). The notion that “Israel should not make concessions for peace when the Middle East is unstable” was rejected by a majority (34% for:51% against).

- In terms of Israel's actions, a large majority see settlement expansion as “a major obstacle to peace” (75%:14%); most respondents also consider that Israel should cede territory “in exchange for guarantees of peace” (62%:25%) and a narrow majority consider that the Arab areas of East Jerusalem should “form part of the capital of a Palestinian state” (40%:31%).

- More generally, Israel is seen as having a negative approach to peace negotiations. 73% (as against 13%) think that Israel's approach is damaging to its “standing in the world” and 64% (as against 16%) consider that continued expansion of the settlements will create “unstoppable pressure for sanctions”. A majority also see the Israeli government as “constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in the peace process” (47%:32%).

**The right to judge Israel**

- A majority (64%:25%) consider that they have “the right to judge Israel” even though they do not live there; comparison with a similar question in the 2010 JPR survey suggests that Jews now consider it more acceptable to make judgements about Israel than they did 5 years ago.
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The 2014 Gaza conflict

- The overwhelming majority of respondents (93%) are supportive of Israel's right to take military action (of some kind) in response to Hamas rocket attacks and infiltration tunnels. However, this group divides 56%:37% between those who think the scale of the military response in 2014 was “proportionate” and those who say it was “disproportionate”. In addition, 5% say Israel was not entitled to respond with military action.

Use of the term ‘Zionist’

- Although about 90% support Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and express attachment to it, only 59% consider themselves to be a ‘Zionist’. There is some evidence that this reflects the view of some respondents that people who are critical of Israel’s current policies should not describe themselves as Zionists even if they are fully supportive of Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.

- The percentage of respondents who call themselves ‘Zionists’ appears to have declined – 59% compared with 72% in the 2010 JPR survey. This apparently rapid change in the use of the term merits further examination.

Knowing what others think

- The survey included a method of assessing how well British Jews can judge the representativeness of their own views on Israel. We found that those with more ‘hawkish’ attitudes tended to over-estimate how many other Jews agree with them; they believe that their own opinions are roughly twice as common as the research suggests they are. People with more ‘dovish’ views have a slight tendency to under-estimate the pervasiveness of their views.

Predictors of hawkish and dovish views on Israel

- A statistically reliable scale of hawkishness-dovishness (the ‘HD scale’) was developed to allow comparisons to be made between the attitudes of different segments of the Jewish community.

- Hawkishness-dovishness scores vary with age, level of education, political stance and synagogue affiliation. Leaving aside political preferences, the most powerful communal predictor of dovishness, accounting for about one-sixth of the variation, is type of synagogue affiliation. Dovishness is associated with not belonging to a synagogue and with membership of a progressive synagogue; hawkishness with membership of Orthodox synagogues.

- There is a strong tendency among strictly Orthodox synagogue members to see external criticism of Israel as being driven by prejudice and/or by failures on Israel’s part to explain its case, rather than by flaws or perceived flaws in Israel’s conduct or policies. That tendency becomes progressively weaker as one moves across the synagogue groupings from strictly Orthodox, to central Orthodox, progressive and non-membership.

- Dovishness is also strongly related to level of education. On some items (e.g. whether Israel’s action in the 2014 Gaza conflict was disproportionate) those who have achieved high academic qualifications are more than twice as likely to take a dovish view than those without a degree.

- Aging is associated with significantly increased reluctance to criticise or undermine Israel’s position, particularly in public, or to endorse any political action against it. However, older respondents do not differ greatly from younger respondents on more abstract principles such as the acceptance of Palestinian rights to a land or the principle of trading land for peace.

Anti-Semitism and thoughts of migration to Israel

- 19% of respondents had “thought about moving to Israel” because of concerns about anti-Semitism in Britain. About one-third of those who had thought about it (i.e. 6% of all respondents) said that they strongly agreed with the idea.

- There were marked differences between different segments of the Jewish community on this issue. Almost half of strictly Orthodox synagogue members said they had thought about migration, compared with just 8% of those who did not belong to a synagogue.

- Predictably, those who see a strong connection between anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel are more likely to have thought about migration.
Communal divergence

- On the most fundamental issues – the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state and the need to ensure Israel’s security and survival – the vast majority of British Jews speak as one. But the data show that just below the surface, different segments of the community have very different positions on issues such as the rights of Palestinians to a land of their own, the legitimacy of settlement expansion and the right to criticise Israel’s policies. The magnitude of these differences raises issues about the future cohesiveness of the Jewish community.
1. METHODOLOGY

Questionnaire Design

Our main interest was in assessing respondents’ attitudes towards Israel and their views on its conduct and policies. Working with Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute and our advisory panel we sought to construct an online questionnaire designed to assess:

1. attachment and commitment to Israel as a Jewish state
2. views on Israel’s approach to peace and the conflict with the Palestinians
3. views on the way British Jews should relate to Israel
4. views on the way Israel is perceived by others
5. attitudes towards Palestinians and their conduct

The questionnaire comprised about 70 attitude statements, in most cases framed as fixed-choice, Likert scale items in which the respondent was asked to express his or her level of agreement or disagreement on a five point scale. Each statement was constructed so as to express an unambiguous view about Israel selected from the set of opinions commonly voiced within the Jewish community. We were careful to balance the number of statements that were supportive of Israel’s position against those that rejected or criticised its stance; and to balance the number of stridently expressed views of a hawkish and dovish kind. Some items expressed compound views (e.g. that both X and Y are true) because this was the only way of capturing a key attitude in an authentic way.

In addition to the Likert-scale items, the questionnaire also measured the socio-demographic and Jewish characteristics of the respondents, including their age, gender, religious observance, educational background, political stance, friendship patterns and synagogue affiliation.

In order to allow comparisons with the 2010 JPR study and other British Jewish sample surveys, we have replicated a number of attitude items used in previous studies, as well as some of the standard questions used to calibrate the respondents’ Jewish characteristics.

The synagogue affiliation variable

We used standard questionnaire items to categorise our respondents’ religious lifestyle and the type of synagogue they belonged to. However, in analysing the data we found that the respondents’ attitudes and behaviours correlate best with a hybrid ‘scale’ that is based largely on synagogue membership but incorporates one element of the question on religious lifestyle. This derived variable is referred to as ‘synagogue affiliation’ even though it incorporates an element of religious practice, and has the following levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Type of synagogue affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>Not affiliated to a synagogue of any kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLM</td>
<td>Affiliated to a Reform, Liberal or Masorti synagogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Orthodox</td>
<td>Affiliated to a non-Haredi (i.e. central) orthodox synagogue and not self-rated as a strictly Orthodox Jew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>EITHER affiliated to a Haredi synagogue OR affiliated to a central Orthodox synagogue and self-rated as strictly Orthodox</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you would like to obtain a copy of the questionnaire please email s.h.miller@city.ac.uk.
**Sampling and representativeness**

The goal of any social attitudes survey is to obtain an accurate picture of the views of a specified population of individuals. In the case of British Jews, there is no methodology that can guarantee to deliver a fully representative sample of the population of interest (see Appendix 1). Indeed, in the absence of a complete register of the Jewish community, or the capacity to randomly sample from it, it is not even possible to check retrospectively whether the achieved sample is, in fact, representative of the community it purports to represent on all the variables that may be relevant.

However, we adopted the standard approach used in Jewish social research to maximise the chance of achieving a representative sample. First, we developed a sampling strategy that we judged to be likely to access all sectors of the Jewish community in a manner that was as close to representative as possible. The sample that was generated was then assessed against the known social and demographic characteristics of the community to check that it was a close match, at least in terms of the variables that are known to be associated with attitudes to Israel - i.e. age, religious affiliation, education and political stance. The sample was then weighted to adjust for any departures from the characteristics of the Jewish population on these key variables. Finally, we were able to examine the extent to which our findings mirrored those of the 2010 JPR survey on three specific attitudes that we judged likely to be relatively stable through time; gross discrepancies between the two samples on these variables would have called into question the representativeness of one or other sample (or both).

In relation to the sampling strategy, three separate techniques were deployed: (i) random sampling of individuals on the electoral register with distinctive Jewish surnames; (ii) exhaustive sampling of Jewish members of an online access panel maintained by Ipsos MORI; and (iii) a structured approach to online snowball sampling. These three methods were combined in order to balance the weaknesses inherent in each one when employed separately.

The combined sample before weighting was found to correspond in broad terms to the known (or estimated) make up of the Jewish community with respect to its age profile, pattern of synagogue membership, educational profile, political profile and geographical distribution. There were some departures from the population characteristics; specifically we found that younger people, Conservative voters, non-graduates and members of central Orthodox synagogues were all marginally under-represented in the achieved sample. The combined effect of these discrepancies would have been to over-represent the prevalence of dovish attitudes by two or three percentage points.

To ensure that all known biases were removed, the data were therefore weighted to bring the sample into line with the Jewish population generally. All the percentages quoted in this report are therefore based on weighted data such that the sample reflects the make up of the Jewish population as a whole in terms of its age, politics, educational profile and synagogue affiliation.

The sample was also found to over-represent male respondents (57:43). However, since male and female respondents were found to have almost identical attitude distributions (see Figure C2.6), we did not weight the data to adjust for the gender imbalance.

In addition to its demographic representativeness, we examined the extent to which our achieved sample matched the 2010 JPR sample in relation to the respondents’ level of identification with Israel, the frequency with which they visited the country and their self-rated knowledge of current political issues in Israel. The similarity between these two samples, obtained using very different methodologies, increases confidence in the representativeness of both samples.

For the reasons set out in Appendix 1, whilst it is possible to demonstrate that a sample is representative of a population in terms of its demographic characteristics, it is not possible to show that it is representative in terms of the particular attitudes under study. However, the achievement of a demographically representative sample increases the likelihood that it constitutes a reasonable approximation to a fully representative sample. For these reasons, we are confident that the attitudes reported here are, at the very least, broadly representative of the views of British Jews on Israel.

**Statistical precision**

Even in a truly random sample, the percentages derived from the sample will be subject to a margin of error. In the present case, given that our sample is based on 1131 responses, the margin of error is 2.9%. This means that if the percentage of respondents holding a particular view is found to be, say, 50%, there is a 95% chance that the true percentage lies between 47.1% and 52.9%. The confidence that can be attached to an estimate is somewhat better for high (or low) percentages, so that, an opinion endorsed by, say, 80% (or 20%) of the members of the sample will be subject to a smaller margin of error (2.3%) in either direction.

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3 The detailed sampling and weighting methodology is set out in Appendix 1.

4 Percentages quoted in this report that are based on sub-groups within the sample are subject to larger error margins and should be treated with caution. However, where comparisons are made between groups (e.g. synagogue members versus non-members), the differences are always statistically significant except where stated otherwise.
**Time dependence**

A survey of this kind can only ‘take the temperature’ of the community’s attitudes during a particular period of time - in this case March to July 2015. Nonetheless, by making comparisons with the earlier survey conducted by JPR, we have been able to identify some attitudes that appear to be relatively stable and some that appear to be changing through time. We cannot, of course, extrapolate our data into the future although we have, at the end of this report, considered some possible implications of the findings for the Jewish community in the immediate future.

In addition to measuring the percentage agreement with particular views on Israel (which may well change through time), we have also examined how the levels of agreement vary with age, synagogue membership and educational background. Variations in attitudes across different segments of the community (e.g. younger versus older people) are likely to be far more stable through time than the overall level of agreement with a particular attitude. The cross-community variations, outlined in Part C, may therefore remain relevant to the way British Jews engage with Israel for some time to come.

**Reporting conventions**

Most of the attitude statements included in the questionnaire offered respondents a choice between six response options:

- strongly agree
- tend to agree
- neither agree nor disagree
- tend to disagree
- strongly disagree
- don’t know

In calculating the percentage agreement or disagreement with each statement, we have excluded the small number of don’t know responses (typically 1% - 5%) and based our percentages on the number of responses in the first five response categories.

In addition, throughout this report, we have combined the tend to agree/strongly agree categories to give a single “agree” percentage – and similarly for the two disagree categories. However, when illustrating the distribution of opinions in graphical form, we have included all five response categories where we consider the additional detail is likely to be of interest.

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number, so that the total percentage for a given set of responses may be slightly above or below 100.

As will become apparent, our respondents’ views are often widely spread, with a variable proportion adopting a neutral (‘neither agree nor disagree’) position. For this reason, simply reporting the percentage agreement does not give the full picture. We normally report both the percentage agreement and percentage disagreement so that the reader can see where the balance of opinion lies in each case. For example, a typical finding might be that a majority (55%;35%) agree with a particular view. This means that 55% of respondents said they agreed, 35% disagreed and the remainder (10%) ticked the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ option.
2. THE FINDINGS

This section sets out the main findings from the survey. It provides data on the prevalence of various attitudes towards Israel and on the way those attitudes vary between individuals and across different sectors of the community.

PART A - Commitment and attachment

We first examined our respondents’ fundamental attitudes towards Israel as a Jewish state, their commitment to its existence and the strength of their attachment to it.

In relation to these core values, the respondents are overwhelmingly committed to Israel’s legitimacy and security, and to its Jewish character (See Figure A.1).

These data illustrate the context and boundaries within which the majority of British Jews position themselves: strongly attached to Israel and supportive of its right to exist as a Jewish state, proud of its cultural and scientific achievements, mindful of its democratic character and committed to its right to defend itself. This pattern of responses closely resembles that obtained in the 2010 JPR survey and indicates their stability over the last five year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the Palestinians want peace they must recognise Israel as a Jewish state, not just recognise Israel’s right to exist</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despite the challenges that remain, I feel a deep sense of pride in Israel’s achievements in art, science and technology</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel is a vibrant and open democracy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel was entitled to respond with military action to Hamas rocket attacks and infiltration tunnels... (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/plays some role in/is important to/is central to my Jewish identity (2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish citizens of Israel have a greater right to influence the direction of the country than its non-Jewish citizens</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes to Figure A.1:

1. This item relates to the 2014 Gaza conflict. The ‘agree’ category combines two separate response options; both responses support Israel’s right to respond with military action, but they differ on whether or not the response is seen as proportionate (56%) or disproportionate (37%). The exact wording of the response options is given in section B8. Reactions to the Gaza conflict are analysed in the detail in that section.

2. This item offered differing levels of identification – 32% said Israel was ‘central’ to their Jewish identity, 41% said it was ‘important but not central’ and 20% said it played ‘some role’. These three categories have been summed for the purposes of this table. See also Appendix 1 (Figure Ap.1.1).
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**Critical Support**

The findings reported later, which record critical attitudes towards particular aspects of Israel's policies and conduct, should be seen in the context of the respondents' fundamental feelings of support and attachment to the country. Indeed, our findings demonstrate a degree of tension between criticism of Israel and the respondents' underlying attachment to it. Thus the majority of respondents (52%:36%) agree with the statement:

*I sometimes feel torn between my loyalty to Israel and my concern over its conduct or policies*.

Among the 210 respondents who are the most consistently critical, a still higher proportion (75%:20%) say that they sometimes feel such tension.

**Democracy and Israel's Jewish character**

There is a strong correlation between the first six items in Figure A.1; those who have pride in Israel tend also to see it as a democratic country, to expect it to be recognised as a Jewish state, to see it as part of their Jewish identity, and so on. Given the association between the appreciation of Israel’s democratic character and Jewish character, we were interested in whether respondents would support the enhancement of one of these attributes at the expense of the other.

We asked our respondents to weigh the Jewish and democratic features of Israel against each other by giving their views on whether "Jewish citizens of Israel have a greater right to influence the direction of the country than its non-Jewish citizens". The majority rejected that idea, but a sizeable minority agreed with it (42% agree : 48% disagree).

The trade-off between democracy and the development or maintenance of the Jewish character of Israel underlies a number of questionnaire items discussed in section 3. It also forms the backdrop to discussions in Israel on the proposed 'Jewish Nation-state Bill'.

**PART B - Key issues**

Beyond the near universal commitment to Israel as a Jewish state, the respondents are divided on most of the political issues confronting the country. We focus in this part of the report on the distribution of opinions on 10 specific issues related to the conflict, setting out the degree of consensus or division in each case. In Part C we discuss the factors that underlie the differences of opinion.

**B.1 The desire for peace**

The pursuit of peace is a priority in the minds of British Jews. Asked to select up to three out of nine areas for prioritisation by the new Israeli government elected in May 2015, the most frequently selected option (chosen by 61%) is "pursuing peace negotiations with the Palestinians", followed by action to halt the expansion of settlements (46%) (Figure B1.1). These options are ranked well above various security, economic and PR imperatives.

A further indicator of the perceived importance of peace negotiations is the finding that half of those with an opinion (42%-42%) in favour of conducting peace negotiations with Hamas despite the history of persistent rocket attacks by Hamas during the 2014 conflict in Gaza (Figure B1.2).

The 2010 JPR survey found a higher level of support for negotiation with Hamas (52%-39%) than is recorded here. This may mean that communal support for negotiations has declined over the period, but there are other possible explanations.

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7 This group was defined as those who said the Gaza action was disproportionate, that Israel was placing obstacles in the way of peace, that its treatment of the Palestinians reduced their attachment and that they feel despair when settlement expansion is approved.

8 This proposed bill has several formulations, some of which have been described by political commentators as subjugating Israel’s democratic and legal systems to the Jewish character of the state.

9 The difference in percentage agreement is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. However, it is difficult to determine whether that difference in the proportions favouring negotiation represents a real change of opinion or a difference in the political make-up of the two samples. See 87 for further discussion of this point.
Peace and sanctions

The issue of sanctions generates greater divergence of opinion than any other examined in this survey. Whilst 24% of respondents are prepared to support some sanctions in order to encourage peace, a clear majority (66%) do not agree with that position, and within that group, an unusually high proportion (two-thirds) select the ‘strongly disagree’ option.

The prevailing attitude towards the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement, as reflected in the Jewish media and in Jewish social discourse, is that BDS is deeply unpopular and commonly regarded as anti-Semitic and/or motivated by a desire to undermine Israel’s survival. In this context, the fact that almost a quarter (24%) would be prepared to support some sanctions as a means of encouraging peace is an indicator of the strength of opinion on the pursuit of peace.

There are marked differences in attitude between different segments of the community, in particular as a function of age, educational qualifications and synagogue affiliation. Such variations are examined in detail in Part C, but we report here some of the largest differences.

The data (Figure B1.3) show that a sizeable minority support sanctions (34%-41%) among the young, the highly qualified academically, and those who are not affiliated to a synagogue; with much lower support (i.e. strong opposition) among older respondents, non-graduates and members of Orthodox synagogues \( ^{11} \) (11% - 18% support).

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\(^{10}\) See, for example, Jonathan Neuman’s article "Backlash has got BDS on the back foot", Jewish Chronicle, p8, 16 October 2015.

\(^{11}\) In this figure "All Orthodox" is a combination of the "strictly Orthodox" and "central Orthodox" categories.
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B2 Support for a two-state solution

Whilst there is considerable debate among political analysts about a range of possible geopolitical solutions to the Arab-Israel conflict, our data show that the majority of British Jews continue to support the notion of two states for two peoples. Indeed it would seem that support for the two-state solution (71% agree: 16% disagree) is grounded in a set of more fundamental attitudes and beliefs (see figure B2.1) which appear to reinforce the two-state concept. These include:

(i) favouring the ceding of land for peace
(ii) seeing Israel’s current status as that of an occupying power in the West Bank
(iii) having strong negative feelings about the expansion of the settlements
(iv) rejecting the proposition that the Palestinians do not have a legitimate claim to a land of their own

Responses to these five attitude statements are statistically correlated (i.e. those who strongly agree with one statement tend to strongly agree with the others and vice versa). This indicates that the five individual attitudes can reasonably be taken to reflect a common underlying attitude dimension associated with support for withdrawal and a two-state solution.

Figure B2.1 - Attitudes associated with support for a two-state solution

Figure B2.1 - Continued (note - item posed in the negative)

Responses to these five attitude statements are statistically correlated (i.e. those who strongly agree with one statement tend to strongly agree with the others and vice versa). This indicates that the five individual attitudes can reasonably be taken to reflect a common underlying attitude dimension associated with support for withdrawal and a two-state solution.

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12 The first three items in this chart were included in the JPR Israel survey. That survey employed a slightly different response scale that did not include a neutral response category. The JPR % agreement scores are 3% to 6% higher than those recorded here.

13 If the levels of agreement-disagreement with each of these attitudes are added together they yield a scale with a relatively high reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.811).
Whilst our findings demonstrate high levels of support for this approach to peace, we cannot rule out the possibility that other options, if presented, would have produced a different outcome. However, we note that support for the two-state approach is closely associated with these other values, and this suggests that it is rather firmly rooted.

**B3 Attitudes to settlement expansion**

In this section we have assembled responses to attitude statements that relate to the West Bank settlements (Figure B3.1). Whilst this issue is often represented as a highly divisive one, our data show that the overwhelming majority of British Jews is negatively disposed to settlement expansion.

A clear majority of respondents (75%:14%) agree that the expansion of the settlements is “a major obstacle to peace” and almost as many (68%:18%) agree that they “feel a sense of despair” every time further expansion of the settlements is approved. “Despair” sets a high threshold for the impact of settlement expansion and indicates the strength of opposition among the majority of respondents.

That observation is reinforced by the finding (see section B1) that “halting settlement expansion” was second only to “pursuing peace negotiations” in the ranking of nine suggested priorities for the new Israeli government.

There is also an expectation among a clear majority of respondents (64%:16%) that international sanctions will be visited on Israel if settlement expansion continues.

There is however, no clear desire for the British government to take “tougher action” to oppose settlement expansion. Only a minority (32% as against 47%) are in favour of such involvement.

Attitudes to British government involvement vary significantly with age:

- of those under 30 years, a majority (42%:35%) is in favour of tougher action by the UK government
- among those aged 70 and above, the balance is completely reversed with a 58%:26% split against tougher action

Interestingly, the older respondents have almost as strong a level of opposition to settlement expansion as do younger ones: 70% of those aged 70 and above say they have a sense of despair about the approval of settlement expansion, while 72% of the under 30s take the same view. But older respondents are far more reluctant to endorse tougher action by the British government on the issue, even though they are equally supportive of the substantive goal of halting settlement expansion. As we note in section C6, older respondents are only marginally less dovish than younger ones on issues of principle (eg settlement expansion), but they are far less likely to endorse statements involving explicit criticism of Israel or proposing action against it.
B4 Control of the West Bank – security and demography

Despite strong opposition to the expansion of settlements and clear support for a Palestinian homeland, respondents’ attitudes to Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank are sometimes equivocal or negative. We examine in this section possible reasons for the limited endorsement of withdrawal when the option is presented explicitly, even though it is strongly supported implicitly in the context of achieving peace.

We asked a number of questions about control of, and withdrawal from, the West Bank, using different contexts to frame the questions:

i) No explicit context: The most general statement put to respondents was that 'Israel has the right to retain control over the West Bank for the foreseeable future'. This item made no mention of security, the peace process or demographic issues, but given the findings of support for the two state solution, the expectation was that retention of the West Bank would be rejected by a clear majority of respondents. In fact, the respondents’ opinions are roughly equally divided on this issue (42% agree that the West Bank can be retained, 38% disagree and a relatively high percentage (20%) neither agree nor disagree – see Figure B4.1).

ii) In a peace context: Once the case for withdrawal is associated with the prospect of peace, support for withdrawal is greatly increased. As already noted (see B2), a substantial majority (62%:25%) support the view that "Israel should give up territory in exchange for guarantees of peace with the Palestinians".

iii) Security as a context: If the question of control of the West Bank is explicitly linked to security issues, support for withdrawal is reversed and a clear majority support the need for control of the land. 50% (as against 33%) agree with the statement that 'Israeli control of the West Bank is vital for Israel’s security'.

iv) Demography as a context: We presented respondents with a brief statement regarding the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs within the borders currently controlled by Israel. This stated that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel could never be secure if the West Bank was allowed to come under Palestinian control</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel gained this territory in a defensive war against Arab attacks. It has earned the right to keep it</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Bank does not belong to the Palestinians</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jewish people have a biblical right to the land</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be impossible to remove the settlements from the West Bank so Israel has to retain the territory</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed analysis of the responses to this question suggests that those who agreed included people who wished Israel to retain the West Bank until a peace agreement is reached. Therefore this item has not been used as an index of opposition to the two state solution.
“a number of experts have predicted that Arabs would soon outnumber Jews in the combined areas of the West Bank, Gaza and the pre-1967 borders of Israel…”

The questionnaire items then linked the issue of withdrawal from the West Bank to the Jewish-Arab population balance (Figure B4.3). We found that once the demographic argument concerning Israel’s control of an Arab majority is introduced, opinions shift decidedly away from retaining control. The majority view on all three of the statements on this issue favours withdrawal. Respondents in this context:

- are against retaining the West Bank given the demographic predictions (49%:32%)
- agree that Israel will be seen as an ‘apartheid state’ if it retains control (58%:22%)
- are for rapid withdrawal to ensure Israel governs over a Jewish majority (39%:34%)

In the second case, the emotive connotations of the word ‘apartheid’ did not apparently deter a substantial majority from agreeing that the term would be applied to Israel if it tried to retain control over an Arab majority.

v) Security pitted against demography: Finally, we examined the effect of pitting security arguments, which in isolation produce majorities in favour of retention, against demographic arguments which by themselves lead to majorities in favour of withdrawal. When the two factors are both in play, albeit based on just one questionnaire item, the security concerns prevail. Thus 52% (as against 34%) of respondents agree that ‘even if there’s a clear Arab majority within the borders controlled by Israel, it cannot withdraw from the West Bank because of the risk to Israel’s security’.

The data presented above suggest that respondents’ attitudes to withdrawal from the West Bank are highly sensitive to the context in which the case for withdrawal is placed. There is clear support for withdrawal when it is linked to peace or to the avoidance of the need to control an Arab majority; but opposition, if it is linked to perceived risks to security.

Logical consistency

The strong support for territorial compromise (in a peace context) paired with majority support for retention of the West Bank (in a security context) suggests that some respondents hold self-contradictory views. Indeed, looking at the attitudes of individual respondents, about one-fifth (19%) agree with both of the following statements:

“Israel should give up territory in exchange for guarantees of peace with the Palestinians”

“Israeli control of the West Bank is vital for Israel’s security”

Similarly, 29% of respondents endorse both of the following statements:

“…[Israel] cannot withdraw from the West Bank because of the risk to Israel’s security”

“A two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours...”
The Attitudes of British Jews Towards Israel

These may be genuine inconsistencies in the respondents’ thinking induced by the effects of context. But it is also possible that respondents have different stages of the peace process in mind when agreeing to such propositions; i.e. those who agree with pairs of statements of this kind are effectively saying that ‘in the immediate future there is a need to protect security by controlling the West Bank, but once suitable terms and guarantees are agreed, withdrawal should be implemented’. A lesson for future researchers is that there is a need to distinguish between those who see the security arguments as a reason for retaining territory permanently, and those who see retention as a transient stage in the process of negotiating a peaceful solution.

**B5 Obstacles to peace**

We presented respondents with a series of arguments that are frequently put forward to explain why Israel or the Palestinians cannot be expected to fully engage in the peace process. We also presented statements about specific concessions or changes that would be necessary for progress towards peace to be made. Our intention was not to assess the validity of these claims, but simply to measure their perceived validity – i.e. the extent to which respondents regard a particular obstacle as valid.

**Perceived obstacles affecting Israel**

Figure B5.1 summarizes responses to some of the factors that are said to stand in the way of Israel’s engagement in the peace process.

Two were rejected by a clear majority of respondents: (i) the suggestion that Israel cannot make concessions when the Middle East is unstable (51% disagree: 34% agree), and (ii) the argument that there is no basis for the Palestinians’ claim to a land (72% disagree: 14% agree).

The arguments that ‘most Palestinians do not want peace with Israel’ and that the Palestinians’ efforts to obtain international recognition are obstacles to peace are rejected and accepted by roughly equal numbers of respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Figure B5.1 - Possible obstacles to Israel’s engagement in the peace process (ranked from high to low acceptance)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>% agree</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the Palestinians want peace they must recognise Israel as a Jewish state, not just recognise Israel’s right to exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace negotiations are pointless as long as incitement against Israel is taught in Palestinian schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no credible Palestinian partner for Israel to make peace with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel should refuse to negotiate unless there is an acceptable unified Palestinian authority that can speak on behalf of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian efforts to get international recognition for a State of Palestine damage the peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Palestinians [do not] want peace with Israel [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel should not make concessions for peace when the Middle East is unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** This item was posed in the positive. To ensure that the ‘agree’ percentages always signal acceptance of an obstacle to peace, we have treated disagreement with the original positive statement as equivalent to agreement with the negative statement as shown (and vice versa).
There were, then, three barriers to Israel’s involvement in peace negotiations that were seen as valid by a clear majority:

(i) the need for the Palestinians to recognise Israel as a Jewish state (70% : 18%),
(ii) incitement against Israel in Palestinian schools (63% : 30%); and
(iii) the lack of a credible partner with whom Israel can make peace (60% : 24%) and/or a partner who can speak for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (50% : 36%)

Perceived obstacles affecting the Palestinians

Figure B5.2 lists some of the obstacles that are said to stand in the way of the Palestinians’ engagement in the peace process.

There is an overwhelming perception that settlement expansion is the key factor; 75% of respondents (as against 14%) agree that settlement expansion “is a major obstacle to peace”. 62% (as against 25%) agree that Israel should cede territory to achieve peace and 40% (as against 31%) consider that the Arab areas of East Jerusalem should form part of the capital of a Palestinian state. The respondents are equally divided (42% : 42%) on whether negotiation with Hamas should be pursued in order to advance peace.

Cross-tabulation of responses to the items listed as potential obstacles revealed that 72% of respondents agree with at least one statement on each side of the debate. This finding suggests that British Jews do not have a monolithic view, but recognise barriers to progress attributable to both sides.

The key obstacles as perceived by our respondents are: settlement expansion, Jerusalem and territorial compromise on the Israeli side; and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, indoctrination of Palestinian children against Israel and the need for credible representation on the Palestinian side. Some of the standard arguments advanced to justify Israel’s position (no legitimate Palestinian claim to a land, no desire on the part of Palestinians for peace, no point in concessions at a time of instability) were either rejected by a large majority or generated agreement and rejection in about equal measure.

We also examined whether respondents see the intervention of other countries as a potential obstacle. This was not the case. Some 58% (as against 28%) rejected the idea that “only Israelis and Palestinians should be involved in peace negotiations; other governments should keep out”.

B6 Perceptions of Israel’s desire for peace

The overall perception of how willing or unwilling each side is to engage in peace may depend on more subtle cues than a simple tally of the number of obstacles erected by each side or the credibility of each one. In this section, we examine overall perceptions of Israel’s desire for peace independently of the specific obstacles discussed above. Figure B6.1 summarizes the findings that bear on this question.
We found that 47% (as against 32%) agree with the statement that “the Israeli government is constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in peace negotiations”. This view is underscored by substantial majorities who agree that Israel’s approach to peace is damaging to its “standing in the world” (73%) and that its approval of settlement expansion generates feelings of despair (68%). Some 64% agree that continued expansion of the settlements will create “unstoppable pressure for sanctions”. And about a quarter of respondents agree with the statement that they would themselves be prepared to support some sanctions if they thought this might encourage Israel to engage in the peace process.

Taken as a whole, this cluster of attitudes suggests that among British Jews the majority view (roughly two-thirds) is that Israel is failing to engage in the peace process, that its tactics to avoid doing so are transparent, and that it is risking damage to its reputation in pursuing that strategy. In short, Israel is seen as having a negative approach to the peace process.

B7 The right to criticise – and the place to do it

We examined two commonly advanced propositions about the right of British Jews to criticise Israel and its policies. One view is that criticism of Israel should be kept out of the public domain; the second is that British Jews have no right to judge Israel at all because they do not live there.

The second statement was examined in the 2010 JPR survey. That sample was divided, with a narrow majority (53:45) agreeing that British Jews did have “a right to judge Israel” despite not living in the country.

Our data (see Figure B7.1) support that conclusion. About a quarter of our sample agree that ‘Jews living in Britain do not have the right to judge Israel because they do not live there’. But a sizable majority (64%) disagree (i.e. they consider that Jews living in Britain do have the right to judge Israel). The proportion favouring the right to judge (a 64:25 split14) is considerably higher than that observed in the JPR survey.
Changing attitudes to judging Israel

One possible explanation for the difference in levels of agreement with the right to judge Israel is random variation between the two samples. However, the difference between the two percentages (64% vs 53%) is statistically highly significant and is therefore unlikely to have arisen purely by chance. It is, of course, possible that the sample we selected has a tendency to be more critical of Israel than the sample recruited by JPR. That would explain the shift in attitudes. However, on most of the other questionnaire items, our findings are very similar to, or slightly less critical of Israel's policies than those obtained by JPR. It is therefore unlikely that our respondents’ greater acceptance of the right to judge Israel is due to an inherent tendency to be more critical than the JPR respondents.

If random variation and sample bias are both excluded, the most probable explanation for the difference is that there has been a genuine shift in communal attitudes over the past five years – that is, it has become more acceptable since 2010 to judge Israel’s conduct, even while living outside of the country.

Public or private judgments of Israel

Figure B7.2 provides data on the related question of the acceptability of public rather than private criticism of Israel. This question sets the threshold a little higher, since it requires acceptance of the right of British Jews to criticise Israel and the right to make that criticism in public. Nonetheless, a clear majority (55:32) find public criticism acceptable (i.e. they disagree with the statement “British Jews should not criticise Israel in public…”).

B8 The Gaza conflict of summer 2014

We asked respondents for their views on four issues related to the Gaza conflict in summer 2014 (Operation Protective Edge):

1. Was Israel entitled to take military action?
2. Was the military response proportionate?
3. Was sufficient effort made to bring the Hamas attacks to an end by negotiation before military action?
4. In the light of other conflicts throughout the world, are those who condemn Israel's military actions guilty of applying double standards?

As noted in previous sections, the vast majority of respondents (93%) are supportive of Israel’s right to take military action of some kind in response to Hamas rocket attacks and infiltration tunnels (Table B8.1). However, of the 93% who consider that military action was justified, there is a significant split on the question of whether the scale of Israel’s response was proportionate – a clear majority consider it was (56%), but a substantial minority (37%) say it was ‘disproportionate’. And a small number (5%) say that Israel “was not entitled to respond with military action”.

![Figure B7.2 British Jews should not criticise Israel in public even if they disagree with its policies](image-url)
The Attitudes of British Jews Towards Israel

Table B8.1  “Now thinking about last summer’s conflict in Gaza, which ONE of the following comes closest to your reaction to Israel’s military action?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>% selecting option</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel was entitled to respond with military action to the Hamas rocket attacks and infiltration tunnels, and the scale of the response was proportionate</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel was entitled to respond with military action to the Hamas rocket attacks and infiltration tunnels, but the scale of the response was disproportionate</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel was not entitled to respond with military action</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above or don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the proposition that:

“Israel should not have responded until it had made greater efforts to bring the Hamas offensive to an end by negotiation and diplomacy”.

29% agree with this statement against 61% who disagree (Figure B8.1).

Taking all these issues into account, five main clusters of opinion emerge in relation to Israel’s operations in Gaza. The breakdown between them, in terms of their relative frequency, is shown in Table B8.2.
About one in seven of those with reservations have only one concern – i.e. about action having been taken before sufficient efforts were made to reach a diplomatic solution. If that group is ignored, the division between those who are wholly supportive of Israel's actions and those who are not becomes 54:46.

### Table B8.2 Attitude clusters - Gaza conflict 2014

Percentage of respondents with each combination of attitudes

Reservations are in **bold**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude cluster</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO RESERVATIONS</strong> - One cluster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to take military action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of action was proportionate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not agree that more effort needed to negotiate before action</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ONE OR MORE RESERVATIONS</strong> – Four clusters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to take military action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of action was disproportionate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not agree that more effort needed to negotiate before action</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to take military action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of action was disproportionate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More effort needed to negotiate before action</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to take military action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of action was proportionate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More effort needed to negotiate before action</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not entitled to take military action</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDETERMINATE on one or more issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/not certain</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings speak to a more nuanced set of reactions to the 2014 Gaza conflict than might have been predicted from the simple “for or against” debate that surfaced at the time of Operation Protective Edge. Judging from this sample, the community appears to be split approximately 50:50 between those who are wholly supportive of Israel’s actions and those who have one or more reservations of some kind.

**Double standards**

In the section of the questionnaire dealing with the Gaza conflict, we asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement:

>Bearing in mind the conflicts raging around the world, people who condemn Israel's military action are guilty of applying double standards

Some 78% agree with this proposition, and we asked those who did to select (from a closed list) the reasons why they thought some people apply double standards to Israel. The most common explanation, selected by 92%, is that critics see “Israel as powerful and the Palestinians as victims”. This is followed by reasons associated with perceptions of Israel’s Western democratic character, anti-Semitism, expectations arising from the effect of Jewish history and the impact of Israel’s actions on Muslim extremism (see Figure B8.2).
Of the 882 respondents who regard condemnation of Israel’s actions as an exercise in double standards, we found that almost a third (31%) were themselves critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza; i.e. they judged the military response to be disproportionate. We compared their explanations for the application of double standards with those of the rest of the group.

Figure B8.3 sets out the relevant data. For both groups, the perceived power imbalance is the most commonly cited reason why other people might expect more of Israel. However, for those who were not critical of Operation Protective Edge, anti-Semitism was seen as the second most powerful driver (79%). But those who found Israel’s actions in Gaza to be disproportionate were more likely to see the demand for higher standards as being derived from Israel’s Western democratic character (82%) and/or its Jewish history (59%), than as an expression of anti-Semitism (52%).

These data demonstrate wide acceptance (78%) of the view that the condemnation of Israel’s military action in Gaza in 2014 reflects double standards. The data also suggest that a significant minority – those who are critical of Israel’s conduct themselves – are more likely to see the expectation of higher standards as being derived from positive evaluations of Israel’s character and history rather than the expression of prejudice.

B9 The term ‘Zionist’

The JPR Israel Survey examined variations in the way the term ‘Zionist’ is used by British Jews. It found that those who defined themselves as Zionists regarded Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people and expressed almost universal support for it. Nonetheless, they showed significant variation in the extent they varied considerably in the extent to which they supported Israel’s current policies.
Those who did not define themselves as Zionists often held identical views to Zionists on the status of Israel and its right to enjoy their support, but were far more likely to be critical of Israel's policies and conduct.

The JPR report concluded that those who define themselves as Zionists use the term in its ‘more fundamental sense’, whereas many who call themselves non-Zionists use the term ‘to mark their disagreement with contemporary Israeli government policy’ even though they shared the same fundamental views as Zionists on Israel’s right to exist.

We found a similar pattern of results in the current survey. A very high proportion of our respondents support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and express attachment to it (circa 90%, see Part A), but only 59% consider themselves to be a ‘Zionist’. It follows that a substantial proportion of the 41% who do not classify themselves as Zionists must nonetheless possess some traditionally ‘Zionist’ attitudes.

For example, of the 466 respondents who responded ‘not a Zionist’ or ‘not sure’:

- 75% support “Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state”.
- 46% regard Israel as “important to” or “central to” their Jewish identity
- 67% have “a deep sense of pride in Israel’s achievements in art, science and technology”
- 36% satisfy all three criteria (i.e. support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, consider Israel to be important/central to their Jewish identity and have a deep sense of pride in Israel’s achievements)

We sought to examine the meaning being attached to the word Zionist by those who express support for and attachment to Israel but describe themselves as non-Zionists. In order to do so, we analysed the attitudes of all those respondents (N=788) who met two of the criteria above (support for Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and seeing Israel as important to or central to their Jewish identity). From within this group, we compared the sub-group who define themselves as Zionists (N = 600) with the sub-group who did not (N = 188). We refer to the latter group as ‘identifying non-Zionists’ to distinguish them from other non-Zionists.

On a wide range of measures, the Zionists and the identifying non-Zionists appear equally attached to the country, equally proud of it and equally committed to its defence and security. Even on items that are critical of Israel’s policies, there is only one variable on which the two groups differ significantly; 37% of the identifying non-Zionists classify Israel’s actions in Gaza as “disproportionate” as against 25% of the Zionists (B9.2). On all other variables, both supportive and critical of Israel’s policies, there is little or no difference between the two groups18.
However, there is one item, not associated with any judgment of Israel’s policies, on which a large difference does emerge; 85% of Zionists accept that a committed Zionist can still be a critic of Israeli policy, but only 57% of identifying non-Zionists hold that view (Figure B9.2).

This finding provides some support for the JPR’s conclusion that those who support and identify with Israel, but classify themselves as non-Zionists, do so because they see criticism of Israel as incompatible with being a Zionist. But that explanation does not account for the 57% of identifying non-Zionists who do not see a contradiction between criticism of Israel and Zionism.

An alternative hypothesis is that the frequent use of the term ‘Zionist’ in general discourse as a pejorative or even abusive label discourages some individuals from describing themselves as a Zionist, even if they consider that, in terms of their personal construction of the term, they qualify as one. However we have no direct evidence to support this view.

We concur with the views of Graham and Boyd19 that the multiple and overlapping meanings attached to the term Zionist are worthy of further examination. This is particularly so given that the usage seems to be changing fairly rapidly; in 2010, 72% of the JPR respondents classified themselves as Zionists compared to 59% in the present study. It appears that fundamental support for, and attachment to Israel as a Jewish state remain more-or-less constant, while the use of the label Zionist to describe that state is declining.

B10 Knowing others’ minds

British Jews differ not only in their attitudes to Israel, but also in the extent to which they believe that their own views are typical or representative of the community as a whole. This is a matter of some interest since the community relies on individuals, particularly those recognised as leaders, being able to judge when they are speaking for the majority and when they are expressing a minority view.

The current study is the first to examine how well British Jews can assess the representativeness of their own views - or, to borrow a term from cognitive psychology, how ‘well calibrated’ Jews are in relation to the prevalence of their views on Israel.

To study this issue, we asked our respondents to give a rough estimate of the percentage of British Jews they thought would share their own views on a series of contentious issues.

Figures B10.1 and B10.2 give the results of this exercise separately for two sub-sets of the sample:

Hawks the subset of respondents who hold at least two of the hawkish views set out in Figure B10.1 (i.e. views expressing resistance to peace negotiations and policies that might promote it)

Doves the subset of respondents who hold at least two of the dovish attitudes set out in Figure B10.2 (i.e. criticisms of Israel for impeding progress on peace)

Hawks

Figure B10.1 lists a series of hawkish attitudes (e.g. ‘Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own’). Some of the hawks20 who hold these views were asked to estimate the percentage of British Jews they thought would agree with them, and their estimates are shown in blue. The red bars show the proportion of respondents in the entire sample who actually hold each of these views.

As can be seen, those who held hawkish views substantially over-estimate the percentage of people who share those views. For example, the statement about Palestinians having no legitimate claim to a land is actually endorsed by just 14% of our respondents, but the hawks who hold that view estimated that 49% would share it.

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18 Anticipating the scale developed in Part C, we note that the Zionists and identifying non-Zionists do not differ significantly in terms of their dovishness ratings.
20 In order to limit the length of the questionnaire, we did not ask the hawks (or doves) to assess the level of agreement with every hawkish (or dovish) view that they held.
For the hawkish views examined in this chart, a relatively small percentage of the sample agree with each one (i.e. between 14% and 34%). However, when asked to estimate the percentage of Jews who share their views, the hawks put the figure at around 50% – 65%, i.e. the hawks over-estimate the prevalence of their views approximately two-fold

**Doves**

The same system was used to measure the ability of those we classified as doves to judge the representativeness of their views.

Since dovish attitudes are more prevalent than the hawkish ones within our sample, the actual levels of agreement with the statements included in Figure B10.2 were between 48% and 75%. However, the doves underestimated the prevalence of their own opinions, assessing the agreement rates as about 5% – 15% lower than they are amongst our respondents. So, for example, the statement that “Israel will be seen as an ‘apartheid state’ if it tries to retain control over borders which include more Arabs than Jews” is actually endorsed by 58% of respondents, but the doves who hold that view estimate that 51% would share it.

In the case of the hawks, the over-estimation of the prevalence of their views is statistically significant in all four cases. For the doves, the under-estimation only reaches statistical significance in the final two cases shown in Figure B10.2.

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21 Each hawk (or dove) was asked to estimate the percentage of British Jews who agreed with them on a particular item. The figure shown next to each blue bar is the average of the estimates produced by the hawks (or doves) who answered that question.

22 We have used \( p=0.01 \) as the threshold for statistical significance throughout.
The Attitudes of British Jews Towards Israel

These findings demonstrate that the more hawkish members of the Jewish community have a false impression of the prevalence of their own attitudes, at least on the issues examined here. The doves are somewhat better calibrated than the hawks, but tend to underestimate the pervasiveness of their own views.

**PART C - Variations in attitudes to Israel**

In this section, we examine variations between individuals and between different groupings within the British Jewish community in their views on Israel.

We address seven issues (C2 – C8), in each case using a newly developed scale of hawkishness/dovishness as a tool to examine the differences between the groups of interest. The development of this scale is described in C1 below.

**C1 A scale of hawkishness-dovishness (H-D)**

It is sometimes of interest to compare the views of different sectors of the community on a single attitude taken in isolation. However, it is also useful to be able to compare groups (e.g. synagogue members and non-members) on an overall index of their stance on Israel that combines a range of attitudes.

We have developed such a scale by examining the correlations between the items included in the questionnaire. As noted previously, items (or attitude statements) are said to be correlated if a person who agrees with one statement (e.g. that Israel has no credible partner for peace) will tend also to agree with other statements that point in a similar direction (e.g. that the Middle East is too unstable for Israel to make concessions for peace). Such a person will also tend to disagree with statements pointing in the opposite direction (e.g. that the Israeli government is constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in peace negotiations).

Statistical analysis of the attitudes measured in this survey shows that there is a core set of 41 items that are correlated with each other and which, if combined together, will measure a common underlying factor or attitude dimension. We have chosen to label this dimension hawkishness-dovishness (or the H-D scale) because the 41 items (like the examples above) reflect support for, or opposition to, steps to achieve peace.

The terms ‘hawkish’ and ‘dovish’ have been used simply as descriptive labels for a continuum of attitudes extending from very strong opposition to territorial and other concessions for peace through to very strong support for steps to achieve peace and criticism of Israeli action that is seen as standing in the way.

We have used a statistical technique (SPSS Reliability Analysis) to construct the scale of hawkishness-dovishness by adding together each respondent’s answers (converted into numerical scores) for each of the 41 items. The scale is constructed in such a way that low scores represent extreme hawkishness and high scores represent extreme dovishness.

For convenience we refer to a score on the H-D scale as a dovishness score, because the higher the score, the more dovish the respondent (or group of respondents). This is purely arbitrary. We could have allocated high scores to hawkish responses and low scores to dovish responses, and called the scale a measure of hawkishness. The key point is that the scale measures a person’s position on a continuum from extreme hawkishness (very low scores) to extreme dovishness (very high scores).

The statistical reliability of the scale is very high (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.963), indicating that it has internal consistency and will produce an accurate assessment of each respondent’s position on the underlying attitude dimension.

Appendix 3 lists the 41 attitude statements that make up the scale.

**C2 The relationship between H-D scores and other variables**

(i) Political stance

A major determinant of where individuals are located on the hawkish-dovish continuum is their general political stance as indicated by which British political party a respondent generally favours. Table C2.1 shows the mean dovishness scores for the main political groupings.
A convenient way of showing whether a given variable (e.g. calorie intake) accounts for the variation in some other variable (e.g. weight) is to calculate what percentage of the variation in people’s weights can be traced back statistically to the variation in their calorie intake. In the present study, we found that 32% of the variation in our respondents’ levels of dovishness can be accounted for by differences in their political affiliation. This implies that 68% of the variation must be associated with other factors.

The UKIP sub-sample is clearly too small to yield a reliable estimate, but taken as a whole these findings show, as expected, that left-leaning respondents have high average scores on the dovishness scale and right-leaning respondents have lower (i.e. more hawkish) scores. In fact, the general political stance of our respondents (i.e. whether they are Labour, Conservative etc) explains 32% of the variation in their ratings on the H-D scale.

This is not to say that dovish attitudes are restricted to the political left. The position of the British Jewish community as reflected in this survey is generally fairly dovish; as noted in sections B1, 2 and 3, about 65% - 75% of respondents adopt dovish positions on the two-state solution, Palestinian rights to a land, opposition to settlement expansion and the perception of a negative approach by Israel to the peace process.

What the above analysis shows is simply that those on the Left in their general politics are on average more dovish than those on the Right. There is, in any case, considerable variation within each of the political groups.

(ii) Community and personal characteristics (apart from politics)

Figures C2.1 to C2.5 show how mean dovishness scores vary respectively with age, synagogue affiliation, Jewish schooling, religious practice (self-rated), educational qualifications and gender.

With the exception of the gender comparison, these graphs show very clear, statistically significant relationships. High dovishness scores are associated with younger respondents, non-synagogue affiliated respondents, those who have not had any full-time Jewish education, less observant respondents and those who have achieved high academic qualifications.

It follows that older, synagogue-affiliated, more observant, Jewishly educated and less highly qualified respondents have lower dovishness scores (or higher hawkishness scores).

These trends accord with the findings of the 2010 JPR Israel survey. However, by measuring levels of dovish and hawkish opinion on a highly reliable quantitative scale, we are able to answer detailed questions about the inter-relationships between these factors and their relative importance in predicting attitudes to Israel.

Table C2.1 - Mean dovishness scores by party “generally favoured”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party “generally favoured”</th>
<th>Mean dovishness rating</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour/Lib-Dem</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waver from election to election/None of these parties</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Attitudes of British Jews Towards Israel

25 A convenient way of showing whether a given variable (e.g. calorie intake) accounts for the variation in some other variable (e.g. weight) is to calculate what percentage of the variation in people’s weights can be traced back statistically to the variation in their calorie intake. In the present study, we found that 32% of the variation in our respondents’ levels of dovishness can be accounted for by differences in their political affiliation. This implies that 68% of the variation must be associated with other factors.
C3 Predictive power of variables associated with dovishness-hawkishness

Some of the variables that are associated with scores on the H-D scale are also correlated with each other. For example, members of Orthodox synagogues are more likely to have had some full-time Jewish education than respondents who do not belong to a synagogue. Similarly, respondents with high levels of education are more likely to be affiliated to Reform synagogues or to be non-members. The fact that variables that may have an influence on dovishness are related to each other, makes it more difficult to disentangle the independent effects of each one.

The standard technique for dealing with this problem is Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA). This was used to assess the predictive power of each factor after allowing for the influence of all the other variables.

Leaving aside a person’s general political stance, the results of the MRA (Table C3.1) show that almost 25% of the variation in our respondents’ attitudes can be linked to five factors: their age, synagogue affiliation, level of religious practice, level of full-time Jewish education and educational qualifications. This is a typical finding in Jewish attitude research – it is rarely possible to predict much more than about a third of the variation in the attitudes of interest.

In keeping with the steep slope in Figure C2.2, the most powerful predictor of dovishness, accounting for about one-sixth of the variation, is type of synagogue affiliation. As noted in Table C3.1, dovishness is associated with non-membership and with Progressive synagogue membership, and hawkishness with membership of strictly Orthodox synagogues.

After synagogue affiliation, the next most powerful predictor is level of education and then age (negatively associated with dovishness – see Figure C2.1). The fourth factor, level of religious practice, is correlated with synagogue membership. Once the predictive value of synagogue membership is allowed for, differences in religious practice only explain a further 1.3% of the total variation. Although this is statistically significant, it is of little practical importance once synagogue membership has been taken into account.

The fifth predictor is the level of full-time Jewish education, which is also negatively associated with dovishness. Although this relationship is statistically reliable when examined in isolation, once the effects of synagogue membership are included, then the extent of a respondent’s full-time Jewish education ceases to add predictive power in its own right.

For practical purposes, therefore, the most significant predictors of a person’s position on the hawkish-dovish continuum are synagogue affiliation, level of educational achievement and age.
The special case of democracy

Among the 41 measures that make up the H-D scale, there are several items which reflect, implicitly or explicitly, a degree of tension between action that appears to play to Israel’s democratic character and action that may be seen as supporting other goals (e.g. developing Israel’s Jewish character, avoiding rapid withdrawal from the West Bank). We list below three such items and record the percentage of respondents who favour the more democratic option first, followed by the percentage who favour the alternative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage Favouring Democratic Option</th>
<th>Percentage Favouring Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish citizens of Israel have a greater right to influence the direction of the country than its non-Jewish citizens</td>
<td>48%:42% (disagree:agree)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ensure that Israel governs over an area with a Jewish majority, it should seek to withdraw from the West Bank as soon as possible.</td>
<td>39%:34% (agree:disagree)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel can’t be expected to adopt Western liberal values when dealing with opponents who are intent on destroying it</td>
<td>41%:49% (disagree:agree)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in two of the three cases, the ‘democratic’ position is favoured by a majority, there is a relatively even division of opinion in all three cases. It would seem that items which pit democratic goals against actions that may be seen as supporting other aspects of Israel’s national interest produce equivocal results. A similar division of opinion is produced when security concerns are weighed against demographic arguments for ceding territory (see B4).
In contrast, single theme dovish or hawkish items (e.g. “Settlement expansion is an obstacle to peace” or “The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own”) tend to attract much stronger majority endorsement of the dovish option (75% and 72% respectively).

### C4 Synagogue affiliation and dovish-hawkish attitudes

Although the trend shown in Figure C2.2 (i.e. the association between hawkishness and synagogue affiliation) is well established\(^3\), the scale we have developed exposes the strength of the ‘synagogue effect’ when measured by standard statistical techniques\(^4\).

To illustrate the extent of the differences between the synagogue groups, we have compared the attitude distributions of the two most divergent groups (strictly Orthodox synagogue members and those who do not belong to a synagogue) on two specific attitudes: (i) the right to criticise Israel in public, and (ii) the ceding of territory for peace. (Figures C4.1 and C4.2). The distributions are very highly skewed in opposite directions: among strictly Orthodox synagogue members, 56% (as against 25%) agree that Jews should not criticise Israel in public, while the majority of non-members oppose that position (19% agree, 72% disagree). The two groups are so divergent that the strongly agree and strongly disagree categories are almost monopolised by one sub-group or the other.

Similarly, strictly Orthodox members are opposed to ceding land for peace (53%:34%), while non-members favour the ceding of land for peace (69%:17%).

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\(^3\) This was found in the 1995 JPR survey of Social Attitudes and the Committed, concerned and conciliatory: the attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel. D.Graham and J.Boyd, JPR Report, July 2010 (op cit).

\(^4\) The standard error of the mean for each group is about 2.0. Thus the two most divergent groups (strictly Orthodox and non-members) differ in their mean attitudes by a 20-fold multiple of the standard error. When submitted to a One-Way analysis of variance, the differences between the synagogue groups generates a very large F ratio (= 79.8) and a significance level of p= 1.12E-46.
Variations across the four synagogue groups

Figures C4.3 – C4.7 extend this analysis to show a clear and repeatable trend in dovish attitudes across all four synagogue categories. The percentage support for dovish positions is two to three times higher among non-members and members of Reform, Liberal and Masorti synagogues (RLM) than among strictly Orthodox synagogues.

For example, 63% of non-members (and 55% of RLM) agree with the statement that Israel is an occupying power on the West Bank; only 28% of strictly Orthodox members take that view.

The trend is repeated across many items, of which four are illustrated by way of example (Figures C4.3 – C4.6).

**Figure C4.3 - % who agree that Israel was entitled to use military force in Gaza BUT that scale was disproportionate [as opposed to proportionate]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Orthodox</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Liberal/Masorti</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C4.4 - % who agree: Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Orthodox</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Liberal/Masorti</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C4.5 - % who agree: Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened my attachment to Israel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Orthodox</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Liberal/Masorti</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C4.6 - % who disagree: The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Orthodox</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Liberal/Masorti</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data illustrate a very marked divergence between the synagogue groupings on some of the most fundamental issues related to Israel and the peace process.

**C5 Synagogue groups and criticism of Israel**

Jewish attitudes towards Israel may be influenced by the attitudes of the wider (non-Jewish) community, but this is likely to depend, among other things, on whether those attitudes are seen to be fair and balanced, rather than motivated by prejudice or misunderstanding.

We examined whether respondents from the various synagogue groups differ in the motives they attribute to those outside the Jewish community who express criticism of Israel.

Figure C5.1 illustrates the extent to which criticism of Israel is seen as a ‘cover’ for anti-Semitism. Here again there are large differences between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox groups. 89% of the strictly Orthodox and 83% of the central Orthodox associate ‘severe criticism’ of Israel with anti-Semitism compared with 60%-70% in the other groups.

Similarly, strictly Orthodox members are far more likely than non-members (61%:37%) to agree that international criticism of Israel reflects “its [Israel’s] inability to explain its actions” rather than “any shortcomings in its conduct or policies” (Figure C5.2).

The proportion who see “condemnation of Israel’s military actions” as reflecting the “application of double standards” is also much higher in the strictly Orthodox grouping than among non-members (90%:65%), Figure C5.3. And among those in both groups who do see criticism as stemming from double standards, the strictly Orthodox are more likely to see anti-Semitism as one of the explanations for the application of those standards than are non-members (86%:66%).

We conclude from these data that there is a strong tendency among strictly Orthodox synagogue members to see external criticism of Israel as being driven by prejudice and/or by failures on Israel’s part to explain its case, rather than by flaws or perceived flaws in Israel’s conduct or policies. That tendency becomes progressively weaker as one moves across the synagogue groupings from strictly Orthodox, through central Orthodox to RLM and non-members.

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**Figure C5.1 - % who agree: Severe criticism of Israel is often a cover for anti-Semitism**

- Non-members: 60%
- Reform/Liberal/Masorti: 70%
- Central Orthodox: 83%
- Strictly Orthodox: 89%

**Figure C5.2 - % who agree: International criticism of Israel has more to do with its inability to explain its actions, than with any shortcomings in its conduct or policies**

- Non-members: 37%
- Reform/Liberal/Masorti: 42%
- Central Orthodox: 52%
- Strictly Orthodox: 61%

**Figure C5.3 - % who agree: Bearing in mind the conflicts raging around the world, people who condemn Israel’s military actions are guilty of applying ‘double standards’**

- Non-members: 65%
- Reform/Liberal/Masorti: 81%
- Central Orthodox: 91%
- Strictly Orthodox: 90%
C6 Variations in dovishness with age

Increases in conservatism with age, and decreases in left-leaning political attitudes, have been widely reported in the research literature. These trends are often attributed to personality changes, in particular reduced ‘openness’ and also to reductions in the capacity to process conflicting information leading to a preference for ‘black and white’ judgements33. The greater dovishness of our younger respondents is therefore unremarkable.

We considered whether the increased hawkishness of the older respondents is simply a standard aging effect, such that younger respondents (other things being equal) would be likely to resemble older respondents as they age; or whether the increased hawkishness of the elderly represents a cohort effect34. The question cannot be answered definitively in a cross-sectional survey of this kind, but further insight can be gained by examining the types of item that generate the largest ‘age effects’ and those which generate the smallest ones. Table C6.1 lists those attitude statements which show markedly more hawkishness in the older respondents, and those statements which show smaller differences. The figures in parentheses in the table represent the proportion of under 30s and over 70s respectively who agree or strongly agree with each item35.

The striking feature of this post-hoc analysis is that several key attitudes associated with the conflict do not elicit more hawkish responses from the older respondents, particularly when the items are framed in relatively neutral language (top right of table). For example, the over 70s are almost as likely to reject the proposition that “the Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own” as the youngest age group (73%:69%)36. And similarly, there is a relatively small difference between under 30s and over 70-year-olds on the question of ceding land for peace (67%:65%) or viewing British Jewish leadership as insufficiently responsive to Jews promoting peace (57%:54%). These findings show that the ‘conservative’ effect of aging has not resulted in a blanket shift towards significantly more hawkish views across the full range of attitudes to Israel.

The two age groups do, however, differ very significantly on items that involve political action against Israel, such as sanctions (top left of chart). The older respondents are also much less likely to endorse statements involving explicit criticism of Israel (e.g. the claim that it is “constantly creating obstacles to peace” is accepted by 61% (under 30s) as against 39% (over 70s)). And the older respondents are much more likely to accept arguments that are defensive of Israel’s position (such as the proposition that Israel cannot “be expected to adopt Western liberal values” when its opponents seek to destroy it (36%:59%)). In all these areas, older respondents are approximately twice as likely to adopt a more hawkish view than younger ones.

Taken as a whole, these data suggest that aging is associated with significantly increased reluctance to criticise or undermine Israel’s position, particularly in public, or to endorse any political action against it. Older respondents appear to be concerned to avoid statements that might be seen as disloyal or that entail explicit blame. However, they are far less resistant to dovish arguments of a more abstract nature (such as the need to cede territory for peace or the recognition of Palestinian rights). In these areas, the differences between the views of younger and older respondents are very modest.

The settlements issue is something of an anomaly. Even though the questionnaire items relating to settlement expansion were explicitly critical and framed in quite emotive language, the older respondents are almost as likely to endorse them as the younger ones. This is consistent with the finding reported earlier about deep-seated and wide-spread opposition to settlement expansion.

The question as to whether the variations in dovishness-hawkishness with age are attributable to the process of aging per se or to cohort effects, remains unanswered. However, the fact that the age effects appear limited to particular kinds of attitudes, i.e. those involving criticism of, or proposed action against Israel, suggests that they may be at least partly an expression of a cohort effect.

In any event, our analysis shows that the respondents’ attitudes to fundamental issues concerning Palestinian rights and the two-state solution do not vary significantly with age.

34 Cohort effects are behaviours or attitudes that arise because of the common experiences of a group born at the same time. If the increased hawkishness of the elderly was a cohort effect (e.g. due to the influence of being born during World War II), then we would not necessarily expect younger people to develop similar attitudes to the current group of 70-year-olds when they reach that age.
35 In general we report the percentage agreement with each item. The reader must look at the wording to determine whether agreement represents a hawkish or dovish response. In one case (marked) we have reported the percentage disagreement because this seemed more meaningful.
36 The age effect is not statistically significant for this item or any other under the heading “small hawkish effect of age”.

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Table C6.1 A list of attitude statements that produce

(a) large differences between younger and older respondents and

(b) small differences between younger and older respondents

The figures in parentheses show (% under 30s agree: % 70+ agree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Large hawkish effect of age</th>
<th>(b) Small hawkish effect of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action against Israel</strong></td>
<td><strong>Issues NOT explicitly critical of Israel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would be prepared to support some sanctions against Israel if I thought they would encourage the Israeli government to engage in the peace process. (41:16)</td>
<td>The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own (73:69 disagree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no justification for requiring Israel to label products produced in the West Bank (37:68)</td>
<td>Israel should give up territory in exchange for guarantees of peace with the Palestinians (67:65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British government should take tougher action to oppose the expansion of settlements in the West Bank (42:26)</td>
<td>The leaders of the British Jewish community do not give sufficient voice to British Jews who want Israel to take a more positive approach to peace (57:54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criticism of Israel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli Government is constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in peace negotiations (61:39)</td>
<td>The expansion of settlements on the West Bank is a major obstacle to peace (84:74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settlements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank (67:45)</td>
<td>I feel a sense of despair every time Israel approves further expansion of settlements on the West Bank (73:70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened my attachment to Israel (49:37)</td>
<td>There will be unstoppable international pressure for sanctions against Israel if it continues to expand the settlements (68:66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Jews should not criticise Israel in public, even if they disagree with its policies or conduct (19:43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British Jewish community is not firm enough in its defence of Israel (21:46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive arguments for Israel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel can’t be expected to adopt Western liberal values when dealing with opponents who are intent on destroying it. (36:59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International criticism of Israel has more to do with its inability to explain its actions, than with any shortcomings in its conduct or policies (33:52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews living in Britain do not have the right to judge Israel because they do not live there (18:33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The high level of academic achievement of British Jews has been well documented in previous studies\(^{37}\). In this survey, we have increased the discrimination at the upper end of the scale by distinguishing between holders of bachelor’s degrees, master’s degrees and doctorates. Using this more sensitive scale, the association between our respondents’ level of education and dovish attitudes becomes very clear and highly significant statistically. Figure C2.5 shows the relationship in summary form and Table C3.1 indicates that educational level is the second most powerful predictor of attitudes to Israel.

Again, to give the relationship more concrete meaning, we illustrate below the differences between the four educational groups on the attitudes examined in relation to synagogue groupings (C7.1 – C7.4).

---

**Figure C7.1 - % who agree:** Israel was entitled to use military force in Gaza BUT that the scale was disproportionate [as opposed to proportionate]

- No degree: 23%
- Degree: 43%
- Master’s: 45%
- Doctorate: 58%

**Figure C7.2 - % who agree:** Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank

- No degree: 43%
- Degree: 56%
- Master’s: 58%
- Doctorate: 61%

**Figure C7.3 - % who agree:** Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened my attachment to Israel

- No degree: 21%
- Degree: 42%
- Master’s: 51%
- Doctorate: 52%

**Figure C7.4 - % who disagree:** The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own

- No degree: 59%
- Degree: 74%
- Master’s: 83%
- Doctorate: 84%

Differences between the respondents’ level of education are associated with wide variations in opinion; those with the highest qualifications are more inclined to favour peace and territorial concessions, and less willing to endorse some aspects of Israel’s policies and military actions. On the issue of support for sanctions, those with doctorates and master’s degrees are almost twice as likely to endorse sanctions to encourage engagement in the peace process as those without a degree (33%:18% - not shown graphically).

Some of the strongest correlations with education are negative ones. Level of education is negatively related to attachment to Israel; and it is related to dissatisfaction with the way British Jewish leaders relate to those with dovish views. Consistent with the arguments of Peter Beinart in the USA[38], we found that the 106 respondents with the highest educational qualifications (doctorates) compared to those without degrees (N=388) were more likely to agree that:

- “Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened my attachment to Israel” (52%:21%)[39]. (Illustrated in Figure C7.3)
- “I sometimes feel torn between my loyalty to Israel and my concern over its conduct or policies” (59%:42%).
- “The leaders of the British Jewish community do not give sufficient voice to British Jews who want Israel to take a more positive approach to peace” (64%:47%).

And to disagree that:

- “British Jews should not criticise Israel in public, even if they disagree with its policies or conduct” (74%:35%).

Combining educational level and synagogue variables produces even more divergent clusters of attitude. By way of example, we compared two subsections of the Jewish community:

1. Members of all Orthodox synagogues with a first degree or no degree (N = 361)
2. Members of RLM synagogues or non-members with a Master’s degree or doctorate (N = 198)

In group 1, just over 20% considered that although Israel was entitled to take military action in Gaza (in 2014), the scale of the response was ‘disproportionate’. The corresponding percentage for group 2 was just under 60%.

In group 1, 36% agreed that “The Israeli government is constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in peace negotiations”. In group 2, 72% did so.

In group 1, 29% agreed that “The government of Israel should negotiate with Hamas in its efforts to achieve peace”. In group 2, 61% did so.

Differences of this magnitude raise issues about communal cohesion which are briefly discussed in Section 3.

**C8 Aliyah and anti-Semitism**

A flurry of recent reports of varying methodological quality has sought to estimate the proportion of British Jews who have considered leaving the UK because of anti-Semitism[40]. These studies, using various formulations of the question, have returned estimates of between 10% and 25%. We found that 19% said they had “thought about” moving to Israel “because of the level of anti-Semitism in Britain” (Figure C8.1), a finding that is almost identical to a JPR assessment conducted in 2012 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Of the 19% in our study, only a third (6%) expressed strong agreement with the thrust of the question.

The proportion of respondents who say they have thought about moving to Israel because of anti-Semitism varies dramatically with synagogue affiliation, from 48% among strictly Orthodox synagogue members through to 8% among non-members (Figure C8.2).

There are also variations as a function of the perceived prevalence of anti-Semitism. Those who strongly agree that “severe criticism of Israel is often a cover for anti-Semitism” are far more likely to have thought about emigration than those who do not agree (35% against 2% based on sample sizes of 415 and 182 respectively). We cannot, of course, demonstrate a causal connection or determine its direction if it exists, but one possibility is that the belief that criticism of Israel reflects anti-Semitism is fuelling thoughts about emigration.
A Survation survey conducted just after the Paris attacks in January 2015 found that 10% ‘had considered leaving the UK’ because of the Paris events. The Campaign Against Antisemitism found that in late December 2014/early Jan 2015, 25% of British Jews had considered leaving the UK because of anti-Semitism. A JPR study for FRA conducted in 2012 found that 18% had considered leaving the UK ‘due to not feeling safe as a Jew’ and a further 1% had left and returned.

**Figure C8.1 - “Because of the level of anti-Semitism in Britain, I have thought about moving to Israel”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C8.2: Percent who have “thought about moving to Israel” because of anti-Semitism by synagogue affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue Affiliation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLM</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Members</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Jews in Britain are united in their commitment to Israel’s existence and survival, and they are proud of what it has achieved. But beyond these existential matters, they are divided in their views on Israel’s strategies, policies and military conduct - and even in their thoughts on how and whether Jews should comment on Israel or seek to influence its behavior.

Recent evidence shows that Jews are predisposed to adopt highly divergent positions on a wide range of social and political issues. Yet it seems from our findings that the special status of Israel - as the focus of Jewish faith, history and national identity - has the capacity to generate even greater divergence of opinion than is found in relation to any other issues.

The main purpose of this research was to calibrate those opinions and examine the variations between individuals and different segments of the community. We hope that the findings reported here will be examined and debated within the British Jewish community and their implications considered.

In this final section of our report, we draw attention briefly to five features of the findings that appear to us to raise important issues for the Jewish community.

1. The diversity of individual opinions

In developing the questionnaire used in this survey, a number of attitude statements were suggested and ultimately included that were seen by colleagues and community professionals as tapping ‘extreme’ views; they were judged likely to attract low levels of support among Jewish respondents. In the event, substantial proportions of our respondents were found to espouse such views, demonstrating that they were not as unusual or ‘unrepresentative’ as we anticipated. One example is the suggestion that sanctions should be imposed on Israel to encourage it to pursue peace – a view that was, in fact, endorsed by 24% of respondents. Another is the view that Jewish citizens of Israel have a greater right to influence the direction of the country than non-Jewish citizens – supported by 42% of the sample.

This discrepancy between what was expected by active, well-informed members of the community and what was actually found seems to raise at least two questions: (i) how is it that communal perceptions are so significantly removed from the reality of British Jewish opinion, and (ii) how, if at all, should the Jewish community adapt to the unexpected diversity of individual opinions within its midsts?

2. The diversity of sub-groups and communities

Similar questions arise in relation to the substantial differences of opinion found between the sub-communities within British Jewry.

The finding that members of RLM synagogues are almost twice as likely as members of central Orthodox synagogues to see Israel’s 2014 action in Gaza as ‘disproportionate’ (47%;25%) is one of many examples of divergence between the major communal religious groupings.

Our findings show that on the most fundamental issues – the centrality of Israel to Jewish identity, the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state, the need to ensure Israel’s security and survival – the vast majority of British Jews speak as one. But the data also show that not far below the surface there are deep-seated differences of opinion – on the rights of Palestinians to a land of their own; on the legitimacy of settlement expansion; on the rights of Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Israel to have a say in their country’s destiny; and on the right to criticise Israel’s policies.

These large and emerging differences in political attitudes to Israel, in conjunction with long-standing differences in religious outlook, have the potential to generate increasing strain on cross-communal structures; they challenge the concept of a coherent British Jewish community.

3. Minorities within minorities

Also noteworthy, we think, are the large variations in attitude as a function of educational achievement and age. The substance of these variations is that younger, highly qualified members of the community have weaker levels of attachment to Israel than others. For example, they are almost twice as likely as older respondents without higher degrees to feel that ‘Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened [their] attachment to Israel’ (55%; 29%).

A possible implication of such trends, if they were to persist through time, is that the sub-group of British Jews who are strongly attached to Israel will become less likely to contain younger or academically highly qualified members of the community than other sub-groups.

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4. Criticism of Israel and the perception of anti-Semitism

Our findings illustrate the strong association between support for Israel’s conduct and the perception of anti-Semitism among those who criticize Israel’s actions: hawks tend to see Israel’s political actions as justified, and hence they are more likely to view external criticism as motivated by malice or prejudice; doves tend to be far more critical of Israel’s political actions and are less prone to see external criticism as being fuelled by anti-Semitism.

We have not examined the thought processes that underlie these relationships – nor could we have done so in the context of a general survey. But we consider this to be an unexplored and important topic, not least because imputed anti-Semitism constitutes a major element in the debate about the validity of criticism of Israel.

5. Accurate representation of British Jewish opinion on Israel

The finding of large and systematic errors in respondents’ capacities to judge what proportion of the community share their own views (see Part B10) raises an important question. If individual Jews are poor at judging the prevalence of their own views on Israel, how well does the Jewish community as a whole, through its leaders and spokespeople, perform that task? In short, are the views of British Jews as a whole being accurately represented to the media and to the community itself? We hope that the trends reported here will encourage some exploration and debate on this issue, and on the other matters raised in this section of our report.
APPENDIX 1: SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

Sampling principles

A sample survey is meant to provide an accurate and representative picture of the characteristics of the population from which it is drawn. This can only be achieved if every member of the target population (in this case British Jews aged 18 or over) is capable of being selected, and if the selection can be done at random. If these conditions are not met, then there is a risk that some sections of the population may be unknowingly under-or over-represented (selection bias).

In the case of British Jews, there is no available register of the members of the population from which a random sample can be drawn, and no other practicable way of obtaining such a sample. Furthermore, even if it were possible to obtain a fully representative master list of British Jews, some bias would still creep into the achieved sample because some potential respondents (e.g. those most interested in the topic) are more likely to respond than others (response bias).

In order to overcome these problems, the standard practice in Jewish social research – and the approach adopted here - is to develop a sampling methodology that is likely to access a wide cross-section of the Jewish community in a manner that is judged to come as close as possible to random sampling. Then, once the sample has been obtained, the sample is compared to the known characteristics of the Jewish community, and a weighting system is used to remove any obvious sources of bias.

Sampling techniques

Three different sampling techniques were employed in this study in order to balance the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each approach when used separately:

(i) Sampling distinctive Jewish names (DJNs) from the electoral register

The use of distinctive Jewish surnames (e.g. Cohen, Goldstein etc) to sample Jewish individuals from an electoral register, telephone directory or similar large database has a long history. It is has been used extensively in the USA and UK as a relatively efficient means of sampling Jewish populations in a manner that loosely approximates to random sampling. The DJN methodology, when applied to the UK electoral register, has the advantage of generating a national sample; the numbers contacted in each location will be approximately proportionate to the size of the Jewish community in that area and the selection of individuals will be virtually independent of age, education and other socio-demographic characteristics. Critically, the targeted sample will also be independent of type of Jewish affiliation, religious observance or intensity of engagement in Jewish life.

Research in the USA shows that Jews with distinctive Jewish names differ from other Jews in relatively minor respects and that the resulting samples are likely to be more representative than those based on other commonly used techniques. That said, DJN sampling has some clear drawbacks; it excludes many outmarried Jewish women, has a slight tendency to under-sample highly assimilated Jews (who are more likely to have changed their names), and may identify non-Jews who happen to have distinctive Jewish names. A further drawback when DJNs are used in conjunction with the UK electoral register is that an unknown but sizable proportion of the recorded addresses are likely to be out-of-date and, even when they are not, response rates tend to be low.

Nonetheless, a DJN sample accessed via the electoral register is likely to produce a more representative sample than one obtained by sampling Jewish organisational membership lists or by using a ‘snowballing’ technique to recruit potential respondents through person-to-person contact.

In the current survey, a set of 11,000 names and addresses of individuals with DJNs was selected randomly from the current electoral register. Letters were sent to these addresses by Ipsos MORI inviting the named recipients to complete the survey online and providing a unique access code. The invitation letter made it clear that the survey was designed to assess the attitudes of British Jews, and the questionnaire itself asked for confirmation that the respondent was Jewish. In addition individual response patterns were screened to detect implausible combinations of responses on Jewish identity questions; none were found.

As an incentive to participate, potential respondents were offered entry to a £1000 prize draw contingent on their completing the online questionnaire and being prepared to provide their contact details.

The DJN methodology generated some 418 responses. As we do not know the number of name-address pairs that were still valid at the time of the mail-out, nor the number that reached non-Jews or people of Jewish origin...
who do not regard themselves as Jewish, it is impossible to calculate a precise response rate. However it seems likely that the rate was somewhere between 5% - 7%; this compares to an estimated 11% response rate obtained by JPR in their 2010 sampling of the email databases of large Jewish communal organisations.

Although the DJN methodology is likely to have generated a reasonably representative target sample in terms of the people who were contacted by Ipsos MORI, the low response rate creates a risk of response bias in the achieved sample. To balance this risk, we developed a second sampling technique which we considered likely to achieve a higher response rate (and therefore a lower risk of response bias), albeit at some cost to representativeness.

(ii) Discriminative snowball sampling of British Jews

A common method for recruiting a sample from an inaccessible population is to identify a group of individuals from the population and invite them to recruit other members who will both complete the questionnaire and invite still others to do the same. ‘Snowballing’ methods of this kind are capable of achieving relatively high response rates because of the element of personal contact, but they run the risk of (i) recruiting an uncontrolled and potentially unrepresentative sample, and (ii) allowing abuse by vested interest groups who may submit multiple responses or circulate links to large numbers of people within that interest group.

In order to mitigate these risks, we developed a discriminative snowballing methodology with the following features:

(i) a group of 72 initial contacts (seeds) was selected by the research team and advisory group such that the group was roughly representative of the Jewish community as a whole with respect to synagogue affiliation, age and geographical location.

(ii) each seed was then asked to send invitations by email to between 10 and 40 of their Jewish contacts asking them to participate; each contact received a personal and unique code that could only be used once (phase 1).

(iii) the phase 1 recipients, in addition to being asked to complete the survey themselves, were provided with three additional unique codes and asked to send those to Jewish contacts of their own (phase 2). We limited the number to three to prevent blanket responding.

(iv) the phase 2 recipients were also asked to send links to up to three contacts using the unique links that were displayed on screen on completion of the survey (phase 3).

This methodology generated 568 responses, of which 444 were generated at phase 1 and 124 at phases 2 and 3. Approximately 1450 unique links were circulated to our seeds at phase 1, so that the response rate was at least 30.6% (=100 * 444/1450). The phase 2 response rate cannot be calculated because we cannot estimate how many links were circulated by the phase 1 recipients.

(iii) An online panel sample

A risk common to both the DJN and the snowballing methodology is that those with a particular interest in Israel will be more likely to respond than other Jewish recipients. We took the view that participants in Ipsos MORI’s Market Research panel would be less prone to this effect because the panel members are used to completing questionnaires on a wide range of topics and are expected to do so in their role as panel members.

Although the Ipsos MORI panel is very large, it does not contain sufficient numbers of Jews, or sufficient detail of their Jewish characteristics, to allow a representative sample to be selected with respect to the profile of the Jewish population. We therefore included this sample on an experimental basis, recognising that it might have to be discarded if its characteristics were grossly divergent from those of British Jews generally. However, if that was not the case, the expectation that panel members would be more likely to respond and less prone to response bias would provide a useful counterbalance to the other two sampling techniques.

There were 211 Jewish members of the Ipsos MORI Online Panel all of whom were invited to invited to participate. 145 did so, representing a 69% response rate.

Features of the three achieved samples

Previous research demonstrates that attitudes to Israel vary as a function of four predictor variables: political affiliation, age, level of education and synagogue affiliation. Using a combination of census data, Board of Deputies/JPR data on synagogue membership and data from previous surveys of the Jewish community, we derived estimates of the profile of British Jews on these four key variables.

For the reasons set out above, we expected the DJN sample to have the closest match to the profile of the Jewish population on the key predictor variables. And we expected the panel sample to be the least representative, but potentially the least prone to response bias.

In the event, all three samples deviated from the population distributions to some extent, but in no case were there gross distortions. As predicted, the panel sample was the least close match; it under-represented younger Jews and to a lesser extent those with postgraduate degrees. These deviations would have shifted the findings in a hawkish direction. The snowball sample over-represented Jews with a left-leaning political stance and those with postgraduate qualifications; this would have produced a dovish bias. The DJN sample, as expected, was the closest match to the population profile; it slightly under-represented members of central Orthodox synagogues and slightly over-represented older respondents; these two biases would have tended to neutralize one another in terms of any overall bias towards hawkish or dovish views.
**Weighting, representativeness and response bias**

In summary, all three samples represented a broad spectrum of the community in terms of their demographic and Jewish characteristics. They varied in their precise make-up and, as with previous British research in this field, it was necessary to weight the data to ensure a close match to the population on the variables most closely associated with attitudes to Israel.

There are advantages in terms of statistical precision in pooling the samples before weighting\(^8\), and this is what we did. The combined sample was then weighted by each of the key variables (i.e. age, level of education, political stance and synagogue affiliation). However the correlation between these variables was such that, having weighted for the first three, the sample was already a close match to the population on the fourth variable (synagogue affiliation) and did not require any further weighting.

It is not possible to guarantee that a sample that has been weighted on the key variables that predict attitudes to Israel will be fully representative of the population on those attitudes. If it were, then there would be no point in seeking to obtain a random sample in the first place. A weighted sample may not perfectly represent the population EITHER because there are additional predictor variables that have not been measured and weighted for OR because there is a response bias (e.g. a tendency for hawks to be more likely to respond than doves, or vice versa) that persists even after weighting.

Nonetheless, a sample that has been weighted to resemble the population on the relevant variables is a good starting point, particularly when it has been constructed using three separate methodologies intended to counterbalance each other in terms of response bias\(^9\) - and includes one sample (the DJN sample) which is an approximation to a random sample.

**Comparison with the 2010 JPR sample**

As an additional check on the credibility of our data, we examined the correspondence between our combined sample and the JPR 2010 sample on three response measures that we judged were likely to be relatively stable through time (i.e. extent to which Israel features in the respondents’ Jewish identity, frequency of visits to Israel and self-rated knowledge of Israeli politics). Major discrepancies between the two samples would suggest that one or other (or both) samples did not accurately reflect the Jewish population as a whole.

The results are shown in Figures Ap1.1, Ap1.2 and Ap1.3. Although obtained using completely different methodologies, the two samples are reasonably concordant, suggesting that the samples are, in broad terms, both representative of the same or similar populations of British Jews.

Whilst we cannot demonstrate representativeness formally, given the nature of our sampling methodology; the fact that the achieved sample is representative of the general Jewish population on the four most powerful predictors of attitudes to Israel; and the fit between our sample and a separate, large sample of British Jews, it is likely that the our findings are at least broadly representative of the views of the British Jewish population as a whole.

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\(^2\) For example, DJNs were employed in the 1995 JPR survey of Social Attitudes of British Jews and in recent Jewish Chronicle polls conducted by Survation.


\(^4\) Outmarried women who retain their own family name or combine it with their husband’s family name may of course be included in a DJN sample.

\(^5\) A 5%-7% response rate assumes that about 60%-75% of the mail-outs will have reached a valid, Jewish, name-address combination (and not an out-of-date address, or a non-Jewish person with a DJN, or a person of Jewish origin who no longer considers themselves to be Jewish). There is evidence that the percentage of people with any particular DJN who are Jewish is lower in areas outside the main centres of Jewish population. Since this was a national sample, the specificity of our DJNs will have been much lower than for a London or Manchester-based survey. (See Kosmin,B and Waterman, S. The Use and Misuse of Distinctive Jewish Names in Research on Jewish Populations. ¬ pp.l-l0 in Papers in Jewish Demography, 1985, edited by U. O. Schmelz and S. Della Pergola. Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University).

\(^6\) 30.6% is the minimum response rate because it assumes that the seeds passed on all the codes sent to them.


\(^9\) Since it is impossible to determine which sample is the most representative, and to what extent each one departs from representativeness, there is no rational basis for weighting the samples relative to one another.
Figure Ap1.1 - Which of the following best describes the role of Israel in your Jewish identity?

- **No role**: 7% (this survey), 6% (JPR 2010)
- **Some role**: 20% (this survey), 13% (JPR 2010)
- **Important but not central**: 41% (this survey), 53% (JPR 2010)
- **Central**: 32% (this survey), 29% (JPR 2010)

Figure Ap1.2 - How much would you say you personally know about the current political situation in Israel (percentage responses)

- **Great deal**: 16% (this survey), 17% (JPR 2010)
- **Fair amount**: 62% (this survey), 57% (JPR 2010)
- **Very little**: 21% (this survey), 26% (JPR 2010)
- **Nothing**: 0% (this survey), 1% (JPR 2010)

Figure Ap1.3 - Percentage of respondents visiting Israel in the past 10 years by number of visits

- **None**: 22% (this survey), 32% (JPR 2010)
- **1**: 11% (this survey), 11% (JPR 2010)
- **2 to 4**: 23% (this survey), 20% (JPR 2010)
- **5 to 10**: 19% (this survey), 20% (JPR 2010)
- **11+**: 25% (this survey), 18% (JPR 2010)
APPENDIX 2: ADVISORY PANEL

Sampling principles

A panel of Jewish lay and professional advisers helped to construct the questionnaire and pilot some sections of it. The draft questionnaire was further refined following discussions with members of Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute.

The Advisory Panel included the authors and editorial adviser as well as other individuals, all of whom are listed below:

**Rafi Addlestone** recently joined Monitor Deloitte as a public sector strategy consultant. Previously a senior policy adviser to Ministers in the Department for Education, he is experienced in public consultation and policy development. Rafi is a graduate of FZY and volunteers for a number of community charities and organisations including UJIA and Limmud.

**Marion Baker** is a qualified leadership and professional development coach, following two decades working in the commercial legal world. She has been engaged with the Jewish community all her life, from younger years in youth movements to current wider family involvement across different areas of the community.

**Margaret Harris** is Emeritus Professor of Voluntary Sector Organisation, Aston University, Birmingham and Visiting Professor at Birkbeck, University of London.

**Maureen Kendler** is a Teaching Fellow at the London School of Jewish Studies and an adult educator in the Jewish community.

**David Lubin** is Head of Emerging Markets Economics at Citi and is a member of the New London Synagogue.

**Stephen Miller** is Emeritus Professor of Social Research, Department of Sociology, School of Arts and Social Sciences, City University and the lead author of this report.

**Adam Rose** is a solicitor and Partner at Mishcon de Reya LLP in London. He is trustee of two communal charities - the Jewish Youth Fund, and the Jewish Council for Racial Equality.

**Colin Shindler** is Emeritus Professor of Israel Studies, SOAS.

**Edward Temko** is a writer and former editor of ‘The Jewish Chronicle’.

**Hannah Weisfeld** is the director of Yachad, where she has worked since it was launched in May 2011.
APPENDIX 3:

Attitude statements used to construct the Hawkishness-Dovishness (H-D) Scale

The scale comprised a numerical combination of the responses to each of the following items. Responses were coded 1 to 5 depending on the level of agreement or disagreement with each one. In all cases the most dovish response was coded 5 and the most hawkish was coded 1.

1. Israeli control of the West Bank is vital for Israel’s security
2. Jewish citizens of Israel have a greater right to influence the direction of the country than its non-Jewish citizens
3. I sometimes feel torn between my loyalty to Israel and my concern over its conduct or policies
4. Despite the challenges that remain, I feel a deep sense of pride in Israel’s achievements in art, science and technology
5. Jews living in Britain do not have the right to judge Israel because they do not live there
6. Israel is a vibrant and open democracy
7. Because of the level of anti-Semitism in Britain, I have thought about moving to Israel
8. I support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state
9. Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians has weakened my attachment to Israel
10. The leaders of the British Jewish community do not give sufficient voice to British Jews who want Israel to take a more positive approach to peace
11. I feel a sense of despair every time Israel approves further expansion of settlements on the West Bank
12. The British Jewish community is not firm enough in its defence of Israel
13. British Jews should not criticise Israel in public, even if they disagree with its policies or conduct
14. A ‘two state solution’ is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East
15. Most Palestinians want peace with Israel
16. The expansion of settlements on the West Bank is a major obstacle to peace
17. The Palestinians have no legitimate claim to a land of their own
18. There is no credible Palestinian partner for Israel to make peace with
19. Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank
20. Israel can’t be expected to adopt Western liberal values when dealing with opponents who are intent on destroying it
21. Israel has the right to retain control over the West Bank for the foreseeable future
22. Israel should not make concessions for peace when the Middle East is unstable
23. Israel should give up territory in exchange for guarantees of peace with the Palestinians
24. If the Palestinians want peace, they must recognise Israel as a Jewish state, not just recognise Israel’s right to exist
25. The Israeli government is constantly creating obstacles to avoid engaging in peace negotiations
26. The Government of Israel should negotiate with Hamas in its efforts to achieve peace
27. The Arab areas of East Jerusalem should form part of the capital of a Palestinian state
28. Israel should refuse to negotiate unless there is an acceptable unified Palestinian authority that can speak on behalf of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
29. To ensure that Israel governs over an area with a Jewish majority, it should seek to withdraw from the West Bank as soon as possible
30. Israel will be seen as an ‘apartheid state’ if it tries to retain control over borders which include more Arabs than Jews
31. Even if there’s a clear Arab majority within the borders controlled by Israel, it cannot withdraw from the West Bank because of the risk to Israel’s security
32. Only Israelis and Palestinians should be involved in peace negotiations; other governments should keep out
33. Israel’s standing in the world is being damaged by its current approach to the peace process
34. International criticism of Israel has more to do with its inability to explain its actions, than with any shortcomings in its conduct or policies
35. The British government should take tougher action to oppose the expansion of settlements in the West Bank
36. Palestinian efforts to get international recognition for a state of Palestine damage the peace process
37. There will be unstoppable international pressure for sanctions against Israel if it continues to expand the settlements
38. There is no justification for requiring Israel to label products produced in the West Bank
39. Peace negotiations are pointless as long as incitement against Israel is taught in Palestinian schools
40. I would be prepared to support some sanctions against Israel if I thought they would encourage the Israeli government to engage in the peace process
41. Severe criticism of Israel is often a cover for anti-Semitism